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Computer Science, Computer Science and Game Theory

Impact of Boycotts in Convex Games: A Comprehensive Analysis

Impact of Boycotts in Convex Games: A Comprehensive Analysis

In this article, we explore the impact of boycotts in international trade using a cooperative game analysis. The authors examine how boycotts affect the value of different groups within a trading network and demonstrate the usefulness of the Shapley value to quantify their economic impact.
The article begins by introducing the concept of boycotts and how they can be used as an instrument of government policy. The authors then delve into the mathematical framework of cooperative games, which provide a standard tool for analyzing participant behavior in social and economic networks.
To illustrate their approach, the authors explore several examples of boycotts, including the one imposed on South Africa during the apartheid era. They show how the Shapley value can be used to calculate the impact of a boycott on different groups within the network, highlighting the power dynamics at play.
The authors also consider the case of Iran, North Korea, the Russian Federation, and Venezuela, where Western nations have imposed economic sanctions in an attempt to influence their policies. They demonstrate how the Shapley value can help assess the effectiveness of these sanctions and the potential consequences for various groups within each country.
Throughout the article, the authors use engaging metaphors and analogies to demystify complex concepts, making it easier for readers to grasp the ideas presented. For instance, they compare the impact of a boycott on a trading network to a domino effect, where one participant’s withdrawal leads to a chain reaction of changes in the overall value of the network.
In summary, "Boycotts in International Trade: A Cooperative Game Analysis" provides a comprehensive and accessible overview of how boycotts work in international trade networks, highlighting their potential impact on various groups within these networks. By using cooperative game theory and the Shapley value, the authors demonstrate the usefulness of this approach for analyzing the economic effects of boycotts and evaluating their effectiveness as a policy tool.